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ABSTRACT 
Using micro data of Japanese banks and borrower firms, we construct an index measure that 
quantitatively describes the monitoring activities of Japanese banks. We examine the effects of bank 
monitoring on the profitability of borrower firms. We find significant positive effects in the periods 
1986-1991 and 1992-1996, although there is no significant effect in the 1981-1985 period . We also 
examine how banks' monitoring affects borrowers. The results show that the positive effects of 
banks' monitoring on borrowers' profitability are mostly caused by screening effects, not 
performance-improving effects.   2
Japanese Banks’ Monitoring Activities and 
the Performance of Borrower Firms: 1981-1996 
 
One of the most dramatic developments in the Japanese economy during the 1990s concerns 
the fate of the country's banks. During the heydays of the latter half of the 1980s, Japanese banks 
and the "main bank" system were considered a major source of the strength of "Mighty Japan." Then, 
following the burst of the so-called Bubble Economy around 1990, Japanese banks faced a 
precipitous decline in their profitability and a pile-up of non-performing loans. In the late 1990s, 
several large banks failed, including the once-powerful Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan. The 
remaining banks are still in bad shape: in the early 2000s, the specter of bank failure and financial 
crisis are looming in every corner of Japan. 
This dramatic rise and fall of Japanese banks poses serious questions regarding the role of 
Japanese banks in the economy. In financial intermediation theory, one of the raisons d'etre of banks 
is considered to lie in their information production function (see Diamond (1984)). Information 
production activities of banks include the search for projects and firms of profitable prospects, the 
monitoring of borrowers to continuously assess their profitability, consulting services for borrowers, 
if necessary, and support to borrowers in temporary financial distress if such support is profitable in 
the long run. However it is not clear-cut how these activities really worked. In fact, the so-called 
“main bank” function arouses much controversy in the case of Japan. Thus, it is necessary to 
measure such information production activities of Japanese banks and their effects on economic 
activities in order to examine the role of Japanese banks in the boom of the 1980s and the bust of the 
1990s. 
Unfortunately, however, very few studies have tackled the issue of measuring 
information-production activities and attempted to examine quantitatively the effect of such 
activities on the economy. As briefly surveyed in Section I, most studies on Japanese banks have   3
simply focused on whether the main bank in the keiretsu (industrial groups) produced a significant 
difference in the economic activities of borrower firms and did so by using a main bank dummy or 
its variants. They failed to measure the magnitude of possible effect. In cases where more direct 
methods were employed, past studies typically shunned measuring monitoring activities and resorted 
to the indirect approach of estimating the production function of deposits, loans and the like. 
The purpose of this paper is to fill this significant gap between financial intermediation theory 
and empirical analysis, and at the same time to shed light on the plight of Japanese banks in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s. In Section III, we present a measure of gauging Japanese banks' 
monitoring activities. By utilizing this new measure, we investigate how Japanese banks' monitoring 
activities influenced the performance of borrower firms in the period before and after the bust of the 
Bubble Economy (Sections IV and V). 
The measure of monitoring activities we construct is the ratio of loan-project examining 
officers to the total employees in the headquarters of a bank. This measure, based on personnel data, 
is clearly one measure of the importance that the bank puts on monitoring activities. In fact, as 
shown in Section II, Japanese banks have been subject to several institutional "reform" waves that 
have a significant effects on the quality and quantity of banks' monitoring activities, and our measure 
tracks very well these changes in the institutional structure.   
In Section III, we examine whether banks' monitoring activities influence borrower firms' 
profitability by using our measure of monitoring activities. We find statistically significant positive 
effects of monitoring activities on borrower firms' profitability in the 1986-1991 and 1992-1996 
periods, although there is no significant effect in the 1981-1985 period. These results clearly show 
that banks' monitoring activities do matter after 1986 as financial deregulation took place and our 
measure captures their effects. However, the findings also suggest that in the early stage of the 
institutional reforms (before 1985), monitoring activities may not have been so important for the 
economic activities of borrower firms. In the period before 1985, when the banking industry was   4
heavily regulated, banks were likely to have been more prone to increasing regulatory rents instead 
of putting more efforts into monitoring activities.   
In Section IV, we examine the nature of banks' monitoring activities and their effects on 
borrower firms' profitability. In fact, two different interpretations are possible for the type of effects 
that banks' monitoring activities have on borrower firms' profitability. The first possible type is 
performance-improving effects in which banks with intensive monitoring activities can provide 
better advice to borrower firms to increase their profitability. The second type is screening effects, in 
which banks can screen out unprofitable firms and keep only profitable firms as their customers. The 
empirical results in Section IV show that a positive correlation of banks' monitoring activities and 
borrower firms’ profitability is mostly caused by screening effects, not performance-improving 
effects. 
This result casts light on the puzzle of the sudden and dramatic fall of Japanese banks as 
witnessed in the past decade. If screening effects work but performance-improving effects do not, 
then banks would be more vulnerable to economic downturns than would otherwise be the case since 
they themselves cannot improve borrower firms' performance and thus have to secure their loans by 
themselves. In that case, considering the depressed economic conditions after the bust of the Bubble 
Economy, it is no wonder that Japanese banks acted rather passively and fell into the troubles of the 
early 2000s. 
 
I. A Brief Review of the Related Literature 
In this section, we briefly review the existing empirical literature on the role of Japanese banks 
in relation to our major research interest, the effects of banks' monitoring activities on the 
performance of borrower firms. We argue that past studies are insufficient in the sense that they fail 
to measure directly banks' monitoring activities and depend on indirect evidence that is often not 
statistically robust. The review here is not exhaustive, and only issues related to banks' monitoring   5
activities are examined. 
The recent literature on Japanese banks may be divided into two groups. The first group of 
studies assumes that the so-called main banks of industrial groups (the keiretsu) mostly engage in 
information production. It also assumes that whether a particular firm is a keiretsu member or not 
makes a significant difference to its business activities. Depending on the particular business 
activities these studies focus on, there are four sub-groups in this type of literature. The second group 
of studies tries to measure the performance of banks and its relation to the information production 
activities of these banks. 
 
A. Main-Bank Dummy Approaches 
 
A.1. Keiretsu and Member Firms' Profitability 
The first group of the literature on Japanese banks examines the effect of the keiretsu on the 
profitability of firms. Since each industrial group is organized around a bank that acts as a main bank 
to its member firms, the effect of industry groups has been frequently regarded as the effect of their 
main bank. 
The research into the economic functions of Japanese keiretsu has a long history. Most studies 
examine whether keiretsu member firms performed better or worse than non-members. In early 
studies such as Caves and Uekusa (1976) and Nakatani (1984), both the profitability and the asset 
growth rate of non-members were found to be higher than that of members. Their results suggest that 
the role of Japanese banks is not positive with respect to the profitability of borrower firms. 
These early results have been confirmed by more recent studies. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) 
compared the profit/sales ratio of keiretsu members and non-members using the classification of 
Dodwell Marketing Consultants. They found that the profitability of member firms was lower than 
that of non-member firms even after controlling for other factors that may affect the performance.   6
Along similar lines, Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000) reported that the TFP (total factor productivity) 
of firms that have kept a stable bank-firm relationship is not significantly higher than that of other 
firms. Morck and Nakamura (1999) used a similar methodology and obtained a similar result.
1  
In this type of studies it is assumed that if a firm is a keiretsu member, then it has access to the 
same services based on the main bank's information production as other member firms. In other 
words, there is no quantitative measure of the bank's information production from its monitoring 
activities. 
 
A.2. Liquidity Constraints and the Main Bank Relationship 
The rather negative assessment of the main bank’s effect on the performance of its borrower 
firms in early studies was reversed by an influential study by Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein (1991). 
They, and many researchers after them, focused on the issue of how main-bank relationships affect 
firms’ investment behavior. Their research is based on the methodology developed by Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) that assumes the internal-fund elasticity of investment is a good 
measure of market imperfections in the form of liquidity constraints. Based on this assumption, 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein compared the investment functions of keiretsu  members and 
non-members. They found that the internal funds effect on non-member firms’ investment was 
significantly larger than in the case of member firms. They interpreted this finding as evidence that 
keiretsu membership and the main bank relation associated with it helped the firm to overcome 
liquidity constraints. This conclusion can also be seen as one piece of evidence that Japanese banks 
                                                 
1 They examined the determinants and consequences of banker appointments to firms’ board of 
directors.    With respect to the determinants, they found banker appointments to be more sensitive to 
firms’ poor liquidity and cash flow than stock performance. As to the consequences, downsizing 
effects after banker appointments were larger in the case of non-keiretsu firms. They concluded that 
"bank oversight need not lead to value maximizing corporate governance" (Morck and Nakamura 
1999, p. 319).   7
play the important role of producing information in the keiretsu, since liquidity constraints are often 
considered a symptom of asymmetric information and/or agency problems. Okazaki and Horiuchi 
(1992) used a more sophisticated method to identify whether a firm had a strong banking tie or not, 
and obtained a similar result to that of Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein.   
However, there are several studies that question these findings. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
showed that internal-fund elasticity may not always be a good measure of liquidity constraints. 
Hayashi (1997) re-estimated the Hoshi-Kashyap-Sharfstein equations and found no significant 
results with respect to internal-fund effects, suggesting some misspecification problems in their 
work.
2 
Regardless of their statistical validity, these studies are unsatisfactory in that they suffer from 
the same problem as those in the first sub-group. They do not measure monitoring activities directly 
but assume that all keiretsu member firms get the same “main-bank services”, while non-member 
firms enjoy no such services.   
 
A.3. Main-Bank Relationship, Agency Costs and Capital Structure 
Another strand of research on Japanese banks goes beyond gauging the effect of the keiretsu 
and directly examines the role of banks in information production.  This line of research assumes 
main-bank relationships reduce agency costs.    Thus, main-bank relationships are expected to affect 
firms' capital structure. 
Hirota and Ikeo (1992) pursued this line of research in regressing firms' debt-to-asset ratio to 
main bank dummies and other variables.  Finding a significant positive correlation between the 
debt-to-asset ratio and main bank dummies, they interpreted this result as the positive effect of 
main-bank relationships on firms' ability to borrow by reducing agency costs.  Prowse (1990) 
                                                 
2 Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) also pointed out some other problems in the findings of Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990).   8
pointed out that U. S. firms' debt-to-asset ratio was highly correlated with measures of potential 
agency problems (R&D, liquidity etc.) while such strong correlation was not found for their 
Japanese counterparts.    He argued that this difference was caused by the fact that U. S. firms do not 
have a strong relationship with banks compared with their Japanese counterparts. 
Here, the effect of banks’ information production activities is again examined in the form of a 
zero-one dummy of main banks like in analyses on the keiretsu explained above.   
 
A.4. The Main Bank as a Last Resort 
There is another strand of research focusing on the so-called “last resort” function of the main 
bank.  Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990), focusing on financially distressed firms, found that 
the investment level of firms with strong banking ties was higher than that of other firms.  They 
interpreted their finding as evidence that the main bank, possessing superior information about these 
firms, played an active role in pulling them out of trouble.  Many other studies, for example 
Shikano (1994) and Hirota and Miyajima (2000), report the same kind of results.     
There is, however, a problem with the interpretation of the results of this approach.  As 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) pointed out, when there exist large investors, regardless of whether they 
are equity holders, banks or other kind of stake holders, ex-post bargaining becomes easy since large 
investors are likely to take the initiative to rescue financially distressed firms if such a move has a 
good prospect. Consequently, findings in the above mentioned studies on the last resort function of 
banks do not provide direct evidence for banks’ superior information production. 
 
B. Bank-Performance Measure Approaches 
B.1. The Production Function Approach 
There exist a large number of studies examining the production efficiency, economies of scale 
and economies of scope in the Japanese banking industry.  These studies are mostly based on the   9
method of estimating the production, cost and/or profit functions of banks.
3 
 These studies, however, involve serious measurement problems with respect to what are the 
outputs and inputs of the banking sector.   Some, like Tsutsui (1988), define the amount of loans as 
banks’ output, others, such as Royama and Iwane (1972) and Kasuya (1986), regard deposits or 
profits as a measure of output.  These studies do not directly measure information-production 
activities. 
To complicate things further, the Japanese banking industry is, like in other countries, one of 
the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy.    Until recently, banks had no freedom to set up a 
new branch and to change interest rates on deposits.    Thus, these banks’ profits are likely to involve 
regulatory rents and thus the amount of deposits, loans, and even profits may not reflect banks’ real 
production of information.  These conceptual problems cast serious doubts on the methodology of 
using loans, deposits or profits as a proxy measure of banks’ production of information. 
 
B.2. Non-Performing Loan Ratio 
Several recent studies have focused on the “performance” of banks other than the amount of 
deposits and loans.  For example, Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) used the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans as an indicator.    They evaluated the effects of the so-called amakudari system – 
whereby banks provide regulators with high-ranking job opportunities after their retirement – on this 
non-performing loan ratio and found a negative correlation between amakudari and sound banking.  
In a similar vein, Tomiyama (2001) used profitability and the non-performing loan ratio as 
performance measures in examining the effect of the governance structure.  She found the 
bad-performance-triggered turnover of top executives to be lower for banks having more amakudari 
directors, thus also suggesting a negative relationship between amakudari  and sound banking.  
These studies, however, do not attempt to measure directly the level of monitoring activities of banks.   
                                                 
3  See Tsutsui (2000) for a survey of these studies.   10
It is not clear in what ways amakudari or other institutional characteristics of Japanese banking 
affect the monitoring activities of banks. 
In sum, we find most studies on Japanese banking do not attempt to measure banks’ monitoring 
activities.  Instead, they either use dummy variables or some proxies that are considered to have a 
close relationship with monitoring activities.  However, these are at best indirect measures, and in 
many cases their relation to banks’ monitoring activities is vague and subject to an embarrassingly 
large number of possible interpretations.  It is now clear that we need a direct measurement of 
monitoring activities.    We turn to this issue in the next section. 
 
II. Measurement of Monitoring Activities 
Whereas most studies reviewed in Section 2 stress the importance of the information 
production activities of banks, they fail almost unanimously to measure how intensively banks are 
involved in such information production activities. They tend to use crude methods such as 
employing main-bank dummies or simply assuming that information production is proportional to 
the amount of loans or deposits. 
There is, however, one important exception. Fujiwara (1998) tries to measure the strength of 
monitoring activities by looking at the degree of independence of the monitoring department in the 
bank. Since his study has served as a stimulus to our own, we examine his method and results more 
closely. We then explain our own approach to measuring banks’ monitoring activities in detail. 
 
A. Fujiwara’s Qualitative Index of Monitoring Activities 
In the early 1980s, many major Japanese banks overhauled their institutional structure, in 
particular the relationship between the headquarters and downstream divisions. Let us take 
Sumitomo Bank as an example, which reformed its organizational system – a step that other banks 
soon followed. Under the old system, which was often called the “function-oriented system", the   11
department of loan-project examination, like other departments such as the personnel or the 
loan-making department, was directly under the direction of the board of directors.  However, 
under the new system, these departments were divided and re-grouped according to types of 
customer or geographical area, such as the international division, the general business division and 
so on.  The chief director in charge of each division was given the right to decide on almost all 
activities within the division except personnel decisions. In fact, there was no obligation to report 
loan-project examination results to the board of directors. 
Under the old system, almost all of the important issues were examined and decided in the 
meeting of the board of directors until June 1981. This system was called “the consensus system 
(Gogi Seido).” However, according to Sumitomo Bank (1985, p. 87), the President at that time, 
Isobe “had serious doubts about the efficiency of the consensus system, and decided to extend the 
authority of the chief director of each division as much as possible.” 
Such a “reform” (if it deserves such a label since it hardly represent an improvement) is likely 
to limit the independence of loan-project examining from loan-making personnel, and may seriously 
hamper the quality of such examinations and thus the quality of monitoring. Fujiwara (1998) 
recognizes this possibility and constructs a measure of banks’ monitoring activities in the following 
way. 
Using the information of the organization of headquarters and divisions published by Nihon 
Kinyu Tsushinsha, Fujiwara identifies whether a city bank or regional bank was function-oriented or 
not and defines a dummy variable to represent this.  He also defines a measure of the relative 
independence of the loan-project examining personnel in the bank.  For banks that were identified 
as function-oriented (the old system), he uses information such as the relative position in the bank of 
the loan-project examining personnel to personnel of other operation departments, their career 
history and so on.  For banks that adopted a new system, he uses information such as the power 
structure among divisions or whether the chief director of the division had ever worked in the   12
loan-examination department.  Fujiwara constructs a measure of independence of loan-project 
examining personnel, which ranges from 0 to 1.   
Next, Fujiwara (1998) uses the ratio of non-performing loans as a performance measure of 
banks.    He then regresses the non-performing loan ratio on this independence measure coupled with 
the organization dummy and other control variables.    The results show the statistical significance of 
his index. While the organizational dummy (new or old system) is not statistically significant, the 
independence measure shows a significant effect on the non-performing loan ratio. That is, the 
higher the independence measure, the lower is the non-performing loan ratio. 
Fujiwara’s study is certainly a seminal one, but there exist several problems. Firstly, Fujiwara 
derives his measure of loan-project examining personnel’s independence using his subjective 
weights, though they seem to be reasonable. In addition, whether one bank follows the old or a new 
system is not always clear. Moreover, not only the independence of the loan-project examining 
personnel but also the quantitative strength of monitoring activities is likely to determine the 
performance. 
 
B. The Quantitative Measure of Monitoring Activities 
Taking account of the above shortcomings of Fujiwara’s qualitative measure of monitoring 
activities, we construct a quantitative measure of monitoring activities. Our quantitative measure is 
based on the premise that the number of loan-project examining officers is a good measure of the 
quantity of monitoring activities. In particular, we use the ratio of the number of officers in the 
division responsible for examining loan projects at the headquarters to the total number of 
employees there. Hereafter we call this the ratio of examining officer at the headquarters or simply 
the EOH ratio. 
The necessary data for the calculation of the EOH ratio can be found in the organization chart 
of the bank, which is taken from the Nihon Kinyu Meinkan (Japanese Financial Almanac) published   13
by Nihon Kinyu Tsushinsha. We construct the ratios of EOH for long-term trust banks, city banks, 
regional banks, trust banks, and second-tier regional banks during 1980-2000.   
There are two caveats about the EOH ratio reported here. Firstly, we were unable to obtain data 
on monitoring activities at branch level. Consequently, as stated above, the EOH ratio is based on 
information relating to the headquarters. It is common practice that loan projects that are smaller 
than a certain amount are examined in branch offices and only those projects larger than this limit 
come under the scrutiny of loan-project examining officers at the headquarters.
4 However, so long 
as there is no drastic change in this limit in real terms, the EOH ratio is still likely to be a good 
measure of monitoring activities with respect to large firms whose borrowing amount exceeds this 
limit.    In fact, in Sections 4 and 5, we examine mostly large firms. The second caveat is that not all 
banks report the number of loan-project examining officers every year. The resulting percentages of 
missing data in the periods of 1981-86, 1987-91, and 1992-96 (these three periods are the sample 
periods in our investigation in the next section) are 14.8%, 40.4% and 12.8%, respectively. To 
minimize information loss due to such missing data, we interpolate missing observations by cubic 
splines in the following way.    The time-series of the average show a nonlinear pattern. In situations 
like ours where the continuity of derivatives is a concern, cubic splines are the most commonly used 
method of interpolation.
5  They are smooth and tend to be more stable than polynomials, with less 
possibility of wild oscillations between the tabulated points (Press at al. 1992).  We interpolate the 
                                                 
4  According to a survey conducted by a trade journal (Kinyu Zaisei Jijou, 1991, April 1, pp. 24-29), 
the limit loan amount at branches’ discretion is on average 91.5 million yen for regional banks and 
81.2 million yen for second-tier regional banks. Unfortunately, we do not have any comparable 
information for city banks and trust banks. 
5 While linear interpolation gives an interpolation formula with a zero second derivative in the 
interior of each interval, cubic spline interpolation gives an interpolation formula that is smooth in 
the first derivative, and continuous in the second derivative, both within an interval and at its 
boundaries (Press at al. (1992)).   14
deviation from the bank-type means and calculate the estimated value.
6 
Figure 1 plots the movement of the EOH ratios calculated for city banks, long-term trust banks, 
regional banks, trust banks, and second-tier regional banks from 1980 to 2000.
7 This figure reveals 
two remarkable facts in the two decades. Firstly, there is a considerable difference between large 
banks (city banks, trust banks, and long-term credit banks) and the medium and small banks 
(regional banks and second-tier regional banks). The level of the EOH ratio is significantly lower for 
city, trust and long-term banks than regional and second-tier regional banks. This difference might 
be a sign of the existence of economies of scale, since customers of small banks are small and 
numerous.
8 Secondly, we find a U-shaped movement in the EOH ratio.  The values are high 
between 1980 and 1986, then drop sharply between 1987 and 1991, and increase steadily and 
noticeably after 1992.  Moreover, the EOH ratios of each bank group tend to move in a similar 
pattern. The co-movement of the EOH ratios in fact exemplifies the change in monitoring activities 
during the 1980s and 1990s. It is related to organizational reforms undertaken in these periods. 
In the previous subsection, we outlined the drastic organizational changes in Sumitomo Bank 
in relation to Fujiwara’s quality index of monitoring activities. Following Sumitomo Bank, other 
banks, regardless of their size and customer bases, embarked on similar reforms in the early 1980s, 
although there were differences with respect to the name of the new organizations, the timing of 
changes, and the extent of what remnants of the old organization were left. For example, Mitsubishi 
Bank started its reform in July 1981 for the same reason as Sumitomo Bank: to get rid of the shackle 
of the old system which was believed to be too slow in making loan decisions. The dramatic decline 
                                                 
6  The estimated value is nearly identical to the actual value whenever the latter is available.   
7 The above procedure is not enough to interpolate all missing data, and there are some banks in 
some periods of which the EOH ratio is still missing.  In preparing Figure 1 we simply ignored 
them and took the average of only positive values of this ratio. 
8  More evidences are needed to obtain a definitive answer on this issue. We will not tackle it in this 
paper.   15
in the EOH ratios across long-term credit, city, trust, regional and second-tier regional banks clearly 
shows the impact of this type of reform. 
Around 1986, there was another wave of reforms.  For example, Mitsubishi Bank started a 
new reform plan in October 1986.  However, the reforms around 1986 and after were not an 
overhaul of the system of that time but an attempt to move further along the path embarked on in the 
early 1980s.    Although the reforms themselves did not aim at the reduction of monitoring activities, 
strong pressure from the top management to the chief director of each division to be an independent 
“profit center” led the division directors to “often put greater weight on business development and as 
a result, pay little attention to credit examination” (Kinyu Zaisei Jijo, 18 February 1991, p.16).  
However, there were some side effects, which were clearly recognized around 1990. 
Consequently, after 1990 and the burst of the Bubble Economy, many banks began to 
reconsider the organizational reforms of the 1980s and to reposition their institution to be 
function-oriented once again. For example, Tokai Bank (in June 1986), Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
(in February 1990), Mitsubishi Bank (in November 1990) and Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank (in February 
1991), gave up the market-oriented (or in other words, customer-base oriented) organizational 
framework and returned to the old function-oriented organization. Most prominently, in November 
1990, Sumitomo Bank, the leader of the reforms in the 1980s, also abolished the organizational 
framework it had then pursued, once again putting the loan-project examination department directly 
under the direction of the board of directors, independent of other divisions and departments. 
The U-shaped behavior of the EOH ratio in Figure 1 tracks very well the above-mentioned 
organizational changes in banking institutions.  The sharp decline in EOH for the early 1980s 
shows the far-reaching impact of the organizational change lead by Sumitomo Bank, while the stable 
movement in the late 1980s reveals the stable functioning of the new system.    This is followed by a 
significant increase in EOH ratios after 1991, indicating the return to the old, function-oriented 
system.    16
The above discussion suggests that there are three distinctive periods in our sample period of 
1980 to 2000.  The first period is between 1980 and 1986, in which the first wave of institutional 
reform took place, following the initiative of Sumitomo Bank.  The second period corresponds to 
the stable movement of EOH ratios between 1987 and 1991, showing the second wave that stretched 
the reform further in the same direction.  The third period is after 1992, in which the institutional 
reforms of the 1980s lost momentum and many banks gradually returned to the old system. 
In the remainder of this section, we briefly examine the relationship between banks’ 
monitoring activities during the era of the Bubble Economy and their performance in the 1990s.   
After the burst of the Bubble in the early 1990s, many loans to the finance, insurance, and real 
estate sector became uncollectible.  Using data for 1990, Figure II plots the relationship between 
each bank’s EOH ratio and the ratio of loans to the finance, insurance and real estate sector to total 
loans.  We find a statistically significant (at the 1% level) negative correlation between the two 
variables. In Figure III, we compare each bank’s EOH ratio in 1990 to the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans in 1997. Again, we find a statistically significant (at the 5% level) negative 
correlation between the two variables. It thus seems that banks with a low monitoring-intensity 
during the Bubble period ended up with inferior loans in the 1990s.   
These two negative effects of banks’ EOH ratio on their lending to the finance, insurance, and 
real estate sector and on their non-performing loans afterwards were statistically significant even 
when we control for the size of each bank.  There was also a significantly positive correlation 
between the EOH ratio in 1990 and the average value of the current profit/total asset ratio in 
1992-1996. These findings indicate that our EOH ratio is a promising candidate as a measure of 
banks’ monitoring activities.  In the next section, we conduct a more thorough econometric 
examination of the effects of banks’ monitoring activities as measured by the EOH ratio on the 
performance of borrowers.     
   17
III. Monitoring Activities and the Performance of Borrowers 
In the previous section we argued that the EOH ratio, which is the ratio of loan-project 
examining officers to the total number of employees at the headquarters, is a good estimate of the 
magnitude of banks’ monitoring activities. We showed that the EOH ratio captures very well the 
profound dynamic changes in banks’ monitoring activities over time as exemplified by the 
institutional changes in the 1980s and 1990s.  In this section, we examine the effects of bank’s 
monitoring activities on the economy, using the EOH ratio. 
There are many possible measures of the performance of economic agents that may be 
influenced by banks’ monitoring activities. Here, we take one of the most direct measures of the 
performance of economic agents, which is the profitability of borrower firms.    Thus, we investigate 
whether higher monitoring activities of banks lead to a higher profitability of the firms that borrow 
from these banks. 
Here, however, the issue of main-bank and non-main bank relationships should be addressed at 
the outset. Usually, a firm borrows from many banks.  However, it is natural to assume that the 
bank from which a particular firm borrows the most has the largest stake in this particular firm 
among the lending banks. Consequently, the effectiveness of their monitoring activities should be the 
largest if they were ever effective.    Following this reasoning, we divide lending banks into the main 
bank and other, non-main banks, and investigate monitoring activities of the main bank and of 




A. The Estimation Equation 
                                                 
9  In this sense, the words “main-bank” and “non-main bank” have no special meaning, and thus we 
do not deal with the issue of the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of the “main bank system” 
associated with the keiretsu industry groups.   18
To examine the possible relationship between banks’ monitoring activities and the profitability 
of borrower firms, we estimate the following equation to explain borrower firms’ profitability: 
 
1 , , , , , , , , 1 , , + + + + + + + + Γ + = t j i t t i t j t j i t j i j t j i L r y ε λ θ η δ γ β α TDUM w n , (1) 
where 
    ,, 1 ,, 1 ijt j ijt ve ε ++ =+ .   (2) 
We will now explain this equation in detail.    The parameters to be estimated are α, β, γ, δ, η, θ, 
and λ. 
We consider three periods: (a) 1981-1986, (b) 1987-1991, and (c) 1992-1996. The start year 
1981 is chosen because of data availability. The end year is 1996 because this is the last year of 
normal financial market conditions: In 1997, financial crisis struck Japan, and bank-firm 
relationships thus were likely to have changed discontinuously after 1997. In fact, some banks failed 
and others were under immense pressure to restructure or merge with or acquire other banks. This 
period of financial crisis is a subject of future research independent of the current one. 
The dependent variable yi,j,t+1 in equation (1) represents the profitability of firmi  in  year 1 + t , 
whose main bank is j . This variable is the ratio of operating profits to total assets.   
The first group of explanatory variables relates to the main bank. As explained earlier, we 
define the firm’s main bank as the largest lender at each particular point in time, following Sheard 
(1989) and Hoshi et al. (1990).
10  
Firstly,  Γj is the period-average of the EOH ratio of main bank j . Since the effect of 
monitoring activities is not likely to change year by year but rather is constant for a period in which 
there is no institutional change, we assume that it is constant for each of the periods outlined earlier. 
                                                 
10 We exclude those firms where two or more banks are the largest lender at the same time for the 
technical reason that we cannot determine which of them is the main bank.  Such cases exist but 
they are practically unimportant.   19
In particular, we assume that Γj is constant and equal to the period average of the EOH ratio within 
periods.   We also include bank-type dummies in order to control for differences in average EOH 
ratios among different types of banks. 
Secondly, ri,j,t is the borrowing interest rate of firmi  from main bank j  in yeart , and Li,j,t is 
firmi ’s share in the total loans of main bank j  in  yeart . Since data on the borrowing interest rate of 
a firm from a particular bank are not available, following Asako et al. (1992) we use the average 
borrowing rate of the firm as a proxy.   
Thirdly, the vector nj,t stands for other factors that determine the effectiveness of main bank j ’s 
monitoring activities. In particular, we consider whether the main bank’s stake in the borrower 
influences its monitoring activities (the firm's loan share in the main bank’s total loans).   
In addition to the bank’s stake, there may be other determinants of the effectiveness of 
monitoring activities. In Japan, many regulations on access to the capital market were gradually 
removed during the 1980s, resulting in an upsurge of unsecured bond issues by financially sound 
large firms (Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998), Miyajima and Arikawa (1999)). This implies that banks 
continued to lose good client firms and were thus obliged to lend more to small and medium sized 
firms as new customers. Since the number of loan-project examining officers could not be adjusted 
immediately to the increase in new lending to small and medium sized firms, loan officers may have 
suffered from work overload, reducing their efficiency. To gauge this possible effect, we also take 
the following factors into account: (a) whether a large number of project to be examined by officers 
affects the effectiveness of monitoring activities
11 (the ratio of the number of the projects to which 
the bank lends to the bank's total loans), and (b) whether the effectiveness is reduced if more new 
small firms are in the queue for loan projects (the share of the number of projects that the bank lent 
                                                 
11  If this has a statistically significant negative sign, this would suggest a “congestion effect”, i.e. 
that the effectiveness of monitoring activities may be compromised if there are a large number of 
projects that the officers have to examine.    If instead we have a statistically significant positive sign, 
this would be consistent with “economies of scale” in loan-project examining activities.   20
to small and medium-sized firms). 
Fourthly, the vector wi,t comprises other control variables that affect the profitability of 
borrower  i  in yeart . We include proxies of corporate governance structure such as the top-ten 
shareholders’ holding ratio, the ratio of debts to total assets, the ratio of loans to total debts, and the 
ratio of loans from the main bank to total loans. We also consider non-main banks’ corresponding 
averages of variables Γj,  nj,t,
12 and industry dummies to take account of possible inter-industry 
differences. 
Finally, we also include time dummy variables TDUM  to control for macro-economic 
shocks.  
The error term εi,j,t+1 is the sum of the random effect associated with bank j (νj)  and the 
remainder the disturbance ei,j,t+1. We assume νj~IID(0,σν
2),  ei,j,t+1~IID(0,σe
2) and that they are 
independent of each other and among themselves. We use a random effect specification to obtain the 
true standard errors for the coefficient of the EOH ratio. 
We assume that equation (1) is a structural equation that determines the firm’s profitability, 
except for the borrowing rate ri,j,t. We first estimate equation (2) using feasible generalized least 




Our sample of borrowers consists of non-financial firms that are listed on the first and second 
sections of the Japanese stock markets from 1980 to 1996.  We exclude the electricity, gas and 
water supply industries because these are heavily regulated industries.  We match firms’ financial 
statement data with banks’ financial statement data and loan data to obtain an unambiguous 
correspondence between firms and lending banks. We include those banks that have experienced a 
                                                 
12  The counterpart of ri,j,t is not included because of data availability problems mentioned earlier.   21
large merger, such as Taiyo Kobe bank (merged with Mitsui bank in April, 1990) and Saitama bank 
(merged with Kyowa bank in April, 1991) during our sample period.
13 Omitting incomplete or 
apparently erroneous data, we obtain 18,521 firm-year observations. 
The loan data source is the Shakunyukin File of the Nikkei Quick data service. It covers 
non-financial companies listed on the first and second sections of the Japanese stock markets and 
those traded in the over-the-counter markets. Two aspects of this data set need to be kept in mind in 
interpreting estimation results. Firstly, the data set does not include those firms that have failed or 
ceased to be listed. Thus, we cannot examine the effectiveness of banks’ monitoring activities in 
cases of corporate failure.
 14  Secondly, the firms in our sample are relatively large (the median of 
the total assets of our sample is ¥43.77 billion during 1986-1996) and may be less constrained to 
obtain outside financing. Thus, it should be noted that our sample does not include most of the small 
and medium sized firms that approximately account for more than 90 percent of banks’ total loan 
customers. 
We obtain firms’ accounting data from Firm Financial Statement Data and banks’ accounting 
data from Bank Financial Statement Data; both are supplied by Nikkei Quick data service.   
Table I shows summary statistics of the major variables used in the regression analysis and the 
                                                 
13 Inclusion of those merged banks does not affect the estimation of the bank effects on the firm’s 
profitability since we estimate the bank effect in the separated periods and within each period they 
do not experience the merger. Although there were some other mergers among the regional banks 
and second-tier regional banks, those smaller merged banks are not included in our sample because 
either most of them did not play the role of main bank in our data or we do not have data on the 
EOH ratio. Note that for the Saitama Bank, we do not have the EOH ratio for the 1987-91 period and 
cannot estimate the bank effect.   
14 This data set is based on firms’ financial reports and annual reports.  Thus, when a company 
collapses or goes bankrupt, the data of that firm are not included after they are de-listed - a potential 
source of sample selection bias.    However, in our sample period, corporate failures were rather rare: 
there were only twenty among all the firms listed on the first and second sections according to the 
Tokyo Shoko Research, Zenkoku Tosan Hakusho.     22
industry distribution of the sample. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the main bank variables. 
Panel B presents those of other non-main banks’ averages. As we have noted earlier, the EOH ratio 
shows a U-shape trend. It is also interesting to note that as large firms start to finance their 
investment through the bond market the sample firm’s loan share in the bank’s total loans decreased 
by about a half during 10 years. Panel C shows the characteristics of the borrowing firms. Note that 
the set of our sample firms changed over time and the statistics do not necessarily show within 
changes of the firm’s characteristics in the same sample. The sample firms became less profitable 
during these periods. They also reduced their liabilities but their bank-loan-to-debt ratio and ratio of 
loan from main bank to total bank loan did not substantially decline. Lastly, Panel D shows the 
industry distribution of the sample firms. About 64 to 68% of the sample consist of manufacturing 
firms. 
 
C. Estimation Results 
Table II shows the estimation results of equation (1) in which we utilize the method of feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) with group-wise heteroskedasticity. 
One of the most important results in Table II is that the coefficient of the EOH ratio for the 
main bank is significantly positive at the 1% significance level during both the 1987-91 and the 
1992-96 periods, while it is insignificant during the 1981-86. This result suggests that, in the period 
of initial reform, banks’ monitoring activities captured by EOH is not correlated with borrower 
firms’ performance in a statistically significant way. In the period before 1985, in which the banking 
industry was still heavily regulated, banks were more eager to increase regulatory rents instead of 
putting more effort into monitoring activities. However, as financial deregulation took place and 
banks’ institutional reforms went into the second stage, monitoring activities of the main banks 
began to show a statistically significant correlation with borrower firms’ performance. However, the 
magnitude of this correlation seems to be reduced after the collapse of the Bubble Economy.   23
We discuss other results only briefly here because of the limitation of space, though they are all 
interesting in themselves. The coefficient on the borrowing rate is insignificant in all three periods. 
One possible explanation for the insignificance of the borrowing rate is that it is measured with error. 
Since the data on the borrowing rate of a firm from a particular bank is not available, we used the 
average. Firms’ loan share is negatively correlated with their profitability in the period 1992-96 at 
the 5% significance level. The coefficient on the ratio of the number of projects to which the bank 
lends to the bank’s total loans is positive at the 1% significant level in the period 1992-96. This may 
be interpreted as indicating that economies of scale in lending may finally have materialized in 
recent years. However, other explanations are also possible so that it is premature to draw any 
definite conclusions from this result. 
It might be argued that there is a possibility of simultaneity between the profitability measure 
and the borrowing rate (see Appendix for more detail on this issue) and a specification test must be 
conducted. We tested for endogeneity, using the Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test. To generate 
an estimate of the average borrowing rate, we use one-year lagged and two-year lagged values of 
itself as instruments. The test cannot reject exogeneity for all three periods. Therefore we can 
conclude that we can ignore the possibility of an endogeneity bias of the estimator. 
Finally, we add one more remark on the EOH ratio. As explained in Section III, there is a 
non-negligible number of missing data, and we use interpolated estimates for these missing data. 
One may argue that these interpolations may cause a problem of measurement errors that may mar 
our result. Keeping this possible criticism in mind, we estimated equation (1) on a restricted data set 
excluding data with estimated EOH ratios. The results are similar to the ones reported here.
15 
 
                                                 
15 These results are available from the authors upon request.  One may still want to point out that 
there may still be some sample selection biases.  However, there is no sign of systematic bias in 
non-reporting of the number of loan-project examining officers, which implies such sample-selection 
biases, if they exist, are rather negligible.   24
D. Controlling for Firm’s Fixed Effects 
In the previous section, we found that the EOH ratio of the main bank and the ex-post 
performances of its client firms are positively correlated after the mid-1980s: both during 1986-1991 
and 1992-1996. It should be noted that we have pointed to a positive correlation, but have carefully 
avoided referring to a positive (direct) influence. 
If the profitability of the firm that borrows from the monitoring-intensive banks is high due to 
the firm’s unobservable characteristics that are not measured in equation (1), the positive coefficients 
merely reflect spurious correlation. To eliminate this spurious correlation we use the firm-fixed 
effects procedure by estimating the following equation:   
1 , , , , , , , , 1 , , + + + + + + + + + Γ + = t j i i t t i t j t j i t j i j t j i e L r y µ λ θ η δ γ β α TDUM w n ,     (3)  
where µi denotes a firm-fixed effect. With the fixed effect removed, the EOH ratio of the main bank 
does not have significant effects both for the 1987-1991 and 1992-1996 periods. This result shows 
that when observed and unobserved heterogeneity among firms are controlled for, the profitability is 
not higher for firms that are affiliated with a monitoring -intensive bank.   
 
V. Screening Effects versus Performance-Improving Effects 
In this section, we examine whether the positive correlation of monitoring activities with firm 
performance implies a causal link in a direct way. In fact, we are not the first to address the positive 
link between monitoring activities of the bank and its client’s accounting profitability
16. However, to 
our knowledge, there seems to be no empirical work examining in what way the bank’s monitoring 
activities positively correlated with the firm’s profitability.   
                                                 
16 Using a sample of some large German firms, Cable (1985) also found evidence that the 
proportion of voting equity controlled by banks, the ratio of bank loan to total debt, and a binary 
measure of whether banks represented on the supervisory board, do improve borrower firms' profits. 
However this study did not examine whether this kind of improvement was due to the ability of 
enforcing efficient behavior or of picking high-quality firms.   25
Two different interpretations are possible for this positive correlation: screening effects and 
performance-improving effects. Banks with intensive monitoring activities tend to have relatively 
profitable borrowers through the following two alternative mechanisms. First, banks with intensive 
monitoring activities can provide better advice to their borrower firms based on banks’ superior 
information. They can also keep corporate managers under discipline. These effects will make 
borrower firms more profitable. We hereafter call the effect of this direct mechanism 
“profitability-improving effects”. Second, by intensive monitoring, banks can screen out 
unprofitable firms and keep only profitable firms as their clients. We call the effect of this indirect 
mechanism “screening effects.” In the Appendix, we develop a simple illustrative model of a loan 
market with profit-maximizing banks and firms where these two effects are present.
17  
It is important to distinguish which mechanism is at work, since they have different 
implications for social welfare. If performance-improving effects are at work, then monitoring 
activities unambiguously improve social welfare. In contrast, if screening effects are dominant, then, 
whether monitoring activities improve social welfare or not is not clear-cut. It depends on the 
conditions in financial and industrial markets such as accessibility to capital markets and so on. 
We empirically examine the validity of these hypotheses by using the “Two-Stage 
Double-Fixed-Effects Model” developed by Bartel and Sicherman (1999).
18 At the first stage, we 
                                                 
17 A remark on the relationship between the profitability and the borrowing rate: in the case of 
“screening effects,” even banks with advanced screening ability will lend funds to relatively bad 
firms, if they can expect higher interest payments.    In the case of “performance-improving effects,” 
firms’ profitability depends not only on lenders’ monitoring intensity but also on firms’ own 
productivity level.  And firms with higher productivity can borrow funds at lower interest rates in 
the lending market.    Therefore, in both cases the profitability of the borrowing firm is a decreasing 
function of the interest rate of the lending contract in equilibrium.  The borrowing rate has been 
shown to be statistically significant and to have the correct sign in the estimation results of the 
previous section. 
18 Using panel data of workers, they investigated why wages in high tech industries were higher. 
They found that the positive correlation between wages and technological change in industries is   26
estimate (a) the firm’s unobservable characteristics effect and (b) the effect of each bank as a main 
bank (using a dummy variable for each bank) on the profitability of the firm, excluding the 
period-average of the EOH ratio of the main bank. The firm’s unobservable effect is the fixed 
component of the firm’s profitability that is not explained by the bank’s characteristic or the bank’s 
affiliation. The bank effect is the component of the firm’s profitability that is given to the borrowing 
firm, but is not explained by the firm’s observable and unobservable characteristics. For example, 
when a firm changes its main bank from bank A to bank B, we can expect that the firm’s 
unobservable characteristics do not change and we can identify bank A’s effect in comparison with 
bank B’s effect. We assume that the monitoring activities improve the firm’s profitability so long as 
the bank-firm relationship remains and does not affect the firm’s unobservable characteristics. Then, 
in the second stage, we regress the firm-specific effect and the bank-specific effect on the EOH ratio. 
If a bank’s monitoring activities as a main bank directly improve borrower firms’ profitability (we 
call this mechanism “performance-improving effects”), then the EOH ratio of this particular bank 
should be positively correlated with this bank-specific effect in the profitability of all firms that 
borrow from this bank. In contrast, if a bank with higher monitoring activities picks out only those 
firms with higher profitability (screening effects), then firm-specific effects should be positively 
correlated with the EOH ratio. Here, we examine which of these are consistent with our data. 
 
A. First Stage: Firm Premium and Bank Premium 
The estimation proceeds as follows. At the first stage, we estimate the following equation:   
  1 , , , , , , , , , 1 , , + + + + + + + + + + = t j i t i i t t i t j t j i t j i t j i L r y ε ϕ µ λ θ η δ γ α d TDUM w n .   (4) 
                                                                                                                                               
significantly weakened when they controlled for individual unobserved effects. Based on their 
regression results of a two-stage double-fixed-effect model, they concluded that we can explain the 
observed higher wages in high-tech industries mainly by a sorting of workers among industries and 
not by the effect of technological change on workers’ productivity.   27
The variables of yi,j,t+1, ri,j,t, Li,j,t, nj,t, wi,t and TDUMt are the same as in equation (1). The error 
term is assumed to be ei,j,t+1~ IID(0,σe
2). The term µi represents the unobservable characteristics 
effect, which is interpreted as the “firm premium” on the firm’s profitability. We assume this term is 
constant over time. The firm premium is unobservable to the econometrician and market participants, 
but it is revealed over time as a firm-specific constant in the regression. The firm premium is 
independent from the observable characteristics of the firm and bank premiums, the latter of which 
we now turn to. 
It should be noted that there is a sizable number of firms that change their main bank in our 
sample period. The percentage of firms that has changed their main bank at least once is 17.2% 
among the 1379 sample firms in the 1987-91 period, and 12.8% among the 1513 sample firms in the 
1992-96. Taking this into account, we construct a dummy variable for each bank that has a value of 
unity if this particular bank is the main bank of a firm in consideration in a particular period, and 
zero if otherwise. The vector di,t is the vector of thus-constructed bank dummy variables. The 
coefficient vector φ of these bank dummy variables therefore represents the “bank premium” of each 
main bank to the firm’s profitability. It represents bank-specific effects that cannot be explained by 
other observable characteristics of the firm, those of the bank, or the unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics. 
In the first stage, we estimate equation (3) for 1987-91 and 1992-96 (in which the EOH ratios 
are statistically significant) by using fixed-effects estimators to obtain the estimated parameters of 
interest: the estimated firm premium i µ ˆ , and the estimated bank premium j ϕ ˆ . 
Table III presents the estimated bank premium by fixed-effects estimators. Heteroskedasticity- 
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. To save space, we do not show firm premiums here.
19 
The Davidson and MacKinnon test does not reject the exogeneity of the borrowing interest rate 
                                                 
19  These results are available from the authors upon request.   28
either in the 1987-91 or in the 1992-92 period. 
 
B. Second Stage: Screening Effects versus Performance-Improving Effects 
At the second stage, we examine whether the firm premium and/or the bank premium is 
significantly correlated with the EOH ratios in order to discern whether screening effects or 
performance-improving effects are effective. As explained earlier, if the bank’s screening is effective, 
the EOH ratios should be positively correlated with firm premiums, while the EOH ratios should be 
correlated with bank premiums if monitoring activities enhance borrower firm’s profitability directly. 
In particular, we estimate the following two equations: 
i i i u + Γ + = ~ ˆ 2 1 ρ ρ µ , (5) 
j j j ω ρ ρ ϕ + Γ + = 4 3 ˆ .   (6) 
In equation (5), the dependent variable is the estimated firm specific effects µi. Here  i Γ ~
 
represents the magnitude of monitoring activities of firm i’s main bank. Since a non-negligible 
number of firms changed their main bank, we proceed in the following way. For example, if the firm 
changes its main bank from Bank A to Bank B, we take the weighted average of the EOH ratio of A 
and B as  i Γ ~
, where the weight to Bank A’s (B’s) index is the fraction of the period in which Bank A 
(B) is the main bank of this firm. In addition to this adjusted EOH ratio, industry dummy variables 
and period-averages of the logarithm of total assets are included to control for industry and size 
effects, respectively.   
In equation (6), the dependent variable is the set of the estimated coefficients of the bank 
dummies. Here Γj represents the period-average value of the EOH ratio of bank j. Dummy variables 
to control for the type of bank (city, long-term credit, regional, trust, and second-tier regional) are 
added to equation (6).   
Equations (5) and (6) are estimated using WLS since the dependent variables are estimated   29
coefficients. Tables IV and V present the estimation results of equations (5) and (6), respectively.
20 
These tables show that firm premiums are positively correlated with the period-average of the EOH 
ratio of the main bank at the 1% level both in the 1987-1991 and the 1992-96 period. In contrast, 
bank premiums are not statistically significantly correlated with the EOH ratios for both periods.   
These results suggest that the positive correlation between firms’ profitability and the EOH 
ratios of the main bank found in the previous section is induced mostly by the selection mechanism. 
In contrast, there is no statistically significant evidence for the performance-improving effects of 
monitoring activities. 
One might argue that it takes time to observe performance-improving effects. We examine this 
argument by regressing the dependent variable at time t + 3 on explanatory variables at time t. The 
results are the same and again consistent with the screening hypothesis. 
 
VI. Conclusions and Implications for Further Research 
In this paper, we have presented a measure of gauging Japanese banks’ monitoring activities. 
The measure we constructed is the ratio of loan-project examining officers to the total employees in 
the headquarters of a bank. By utilizing this new measure, we tested two competing hypotheses 
about the nature of banks' monitoring, (1) the monitoring improved profitability of borrowing firms 
and (2) it simply "screened" out unprofitable firms, by using the data of all Japanese corporations 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1981 and 1997. The result was inconsistent with the 
profitability-improving hypothesis of banks' active involvement in borrowing firms, and strongly 
suggested a passive role as a screening device for banks. It means that banks are more vulnerable to 
economic downturns than otherwise would be the case since they themselves do not have the ability 
to improve borrower firms’ performance and thus to secure their loans by themselves. Then, taking 
account of the depressed economic conditions after the bust of the Bubble Economy, it is no wonder 
                                                 
20  It should be noted here that we assume away any possible endogeneity of firm-bank matching.   30
that Japanese banks acted rather passively and fell into the difficulties of the early 2000s. 
We also found that many banks dramatically reduced their monitoring activities between 1981 
and 1985. Probably this reorganization contributed to the Bubble Economy in the second half of 
1980s. There is a strong case to be made for analyzing what economic conditions caused this boom 
of reorganizations and banks with what characteristics could resist the temptation of this risky 
reorganization. 
   31
APPENDIX 
In this Appendix we present a simple model of banks’ monitoring activities and borrowers’ 
performance. By constructing a theoretical model of a lending market with profit-maximizing banks 
and borrowing firms, we analyze the relationship between banks’ monitoring activities and the 
profitability of borrowing firms. As we discussed in section IV, banks with intensive monitoring 
activities tend to have relatively profitable borrowers through the following two alternative 
mechanisms. Firstly, through intensive monitoring, banks can screen out unprofitable firms. In the 
first section of this appendix we present a model of this “screening mechanism.” Secondly, banks 
applying intensive monitoring can provide better advice to borrowers based on superior information. 
They can also keep corporate managers under discipline. These activities will make borrowing firms 
more profitable. In the second section we will present a model of this “profitability-improving 
mechanism.”  
 
A. A. Model of the Screening Effect 
First, we focus on the screening effect of banks’ monitoring activities. In screening processes 
we may have phenomena which are specific to transactions under asymmetric information such as 
adverse selection and signaling. Additionally, as a result of the screening, bad firms may not be able 
to obtain funds. In this case, observations of borrowers will be a result of a selection process. These 
phenomena make both the theoretical and the econometric analysis very complicated. To simplify 
our analysis we will not take these factors into account in our model.   
We consider an economy with many firms and banks. In period 0, each firm borrows funds 
from a bank and invests these in its own project. In period 1, the firm ends the project and returns the 
funds to the bank. We assume that firms do not have their own funds and they borrow the total 
amount necessary for the project. The total cost of each firm’s project, Li , is assumed to be given.   
We start by considering firm i which borrowed funds from bank j in period 0. Its total value   32
(including the money to be returned to its bank) in period 1 is expressed by 
) exp( i i i u m L +  
where  mi denotes firm i’s specific determinant of profitability of the project and ui denotes a 
stochastic variable. The above value is the maximum amount of money which firm i can return to the 
bank. At the beginning of period 0, the value of mi is only known by firm i. The expectation of ui is 0 
and the standard deviation is σ. Let f(ui) denote the probability density function.   
In order to know the profitability of firm mi, a bank needs to conduct a screening. We assume 
that under our parameter values there exists no “pooling” equilibrium, in which banks lend to all the 
firms at an identical interest rate with no screening.   
Bank j’s cost of screening firm i is expressed by 
Ci
j = C(Zj,vi) 
where Zj denotes bank j’s monitoring capability. vi is the index of the difficulty of screening firm i. 
C( ) is a decreasing function of Zj and an increasing function of vi. We assume that Zj is an increasing 
function of the intensity of bank j’s monitoring activities Γj:  
Zj = Z(Γ j,nj) 
where  n j denotes a vector of the other determinants of bank j’s monitoring capability. Γj , the 
intensity of each bank’s monitoring activity, is assumed to be predetermined. Function C( ) is 



















Figure 2 shows the relationship between screening cost C( ) and bank j’s monitoring capability 
Zj for a given vi, the difficulty of screening firm i. The upper curve denotes this relationship for those 
firms where screening is relatively difficult. Under these assumptions, banks with higher monitoring 
capabilities tend to have a comparative advantage in lending to firms where screening is relatively 
difficult. As Figure 2 shows, the screening-cost minimizing value of bank j’s monitoring capability Zj   33
is uniquely determined for each vi, the difficulty of screening firm i. We express this relationship by 
Z = γ(v)                                               ( A 1 )  
where γ( ) is an increasing function.   
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where ri
j denotes the interest rate charged by bank j to firm i. In period 0, the expected present 
value of bank j’s gain from its lending to firm i is expressed by 
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∞ −                   ( A 3 )  
The first integral denotes the present value of the money the bank can collect when the firm 
defaults. A denotes the fixed costs of each loan and rm denotes the interest rate in the inter-bank 
market, which is equal to banks’ opportunity cost of lending.   
Since each lending is extended on a face-to-face basis, the interest rate depends on the 
bargaining powers of each side. To simplify our analysis we assume that firms can make a “take it or 
leave it” offer and that the interest rate of each loan is determined at the level that makes banks’ 
marginal gain from lending equal zero. We assume that Γj  (each bank’s monitoring intensity), nj 
(other factors determining banks’ capability of screening), vi (the difficulty of screening firm i) and 
Li (the total cost of each firm’s project) are known by all firms and banks in period 0.   
We also assume that each firm can choose its bank. Then we can easily show that each firm 
with vi will choose the bank, with the screening capability Zj, which minimizes the screening cost 
C(Zj, vi). We assume that there is a sufficient variety of banks so that each firm with vi can find a 
bank with Zj which satisfies equation (A1).   
Under the above assumptions, firm i can borrow money at the interest rate that satisfies the 
following zero-profit condition of the bank:   34
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where Zj is determined by
21 
) ( i j v Z γ =  
Using the above two equations we can express the equilibrium interest rate as a decreasing 
function of the profitability of firm mi and the loan amount Li
j and as an increasing function of vi, the 




                                           ( A 5 )  
We also assume that the screening cost C( ) is small so that all firms will have an incentive to 
borrow funds. 
Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive the following equation. 
mi = m(vj,r i
j,Li)
 



















                                                    ( A 9 )  
Using equation (A6) and function Z( ), we can derive the following equation for empirical 
analysis. 
                                                 
21  More rigorously, we assume the following sequential process in the period 0 negotiation.     
1.  Each firm chooses a bank to negotiate with. 
2.  Firm i offers bank j borrowing conditions that define the size of the funds Li
j and the 
interest rate schedule, which is a function of mi. mi is not yet known by bank j. 
3.  Each bank decides whether to accept firms’ offers. 
4.  Banks start their screening of those firms whose offer they accepted. 
5.  Once bank j knows mi, the level of the interest rate ri
j is decided.   35








The left-hand side of the first equality denotes the ex-post profitability of firm i’s project. This 
equation can be rewritten as 
i i
j
i i j j i i u L r v g u m + Γ = + ) , , , ( 1 n                                  ( A 1 0 )  
On the right-hand side of the equation all the variables except the error term are observable. 
g1( ) is an increasing function of Γj  and a decreasing function of Li and ri
j. 
  
B. A. Model of the Performance-Improving Effect 
Next we present a model of the profitability-improving mechanism. We assume that banks 
pursuing intensive monitoring can provide good advice to their borrowers based on superior 
information. They can also keep corporate managers disciplined. These activities will make 
borrowing firms more profitable.   
The intensity of each bank’s monitoring activity is assumed to be predetermined. Let Γj denote 
the monitoring intensity of bank j. We assume that banks with a relatively higher monitoring 
intensity can provide good advice to the borrowing customers; and this advice increases the 
profitability of the borrowing firms. Let 
Li exp(mi + ψ j + ui) 
denote the total value of firm i in period 1, including the funds obtained from bank j in period 0 
which need to be returned. mi denotes the firm-specific determinant of the profitability of the project, 
ψj denotes the contribution of bank j’s monitoring activities to the profitability of the project, and ui 
denotes the stochastic variable. We assume that firms do not have their own funds and the total cost 
of each firm’s project, Li is given. ui denotes a stochastic variable which follows a normal 
distribution. The average is zero and the standard deviation is σ. Let f(ui) denote the probability 
density function.     36
We assume that ψj is an increasing function of Γj which denotes the intensity of bank j’s 
monitoring activity:   
ψ j = ψ(Γ j,nj) 
where  nj denotes bank j’s other characteristics which affect its contribution to its borrowers’ 
profitability.  
In period 0 the expected present value of firm i’s net profit in period 1 is expressed as 








j denotes the interest rate of bank j’s loan to firm i. In period 0, the expected present value of 
bank j’s gain from its lending to firm i is expressed by 




i −mi −ψ j
∫ + Li exp(ri
j)f (ui)dui
r j
i −mi −ψ j
+∞
∫
− (Li + A + C(Γ j,nj))exp(rm)
          ( A 1 2 )  
Here we assume that bank j’s screening cost C( ) is an increasing function of bank j’s intensity 
of monitoring and a function of bank j’s other characteristics nj. In equation (A12) the definition of 
the other variables is the same as in equation (A4).   
As we have already discussed in our model of the screening mechanism, the level of the 
equilibrium interest rate will depend on the bargaining power of banks and borrowers. But as we will 
show later, in the case of our profitability-improving model, the assumption regarding which side 
possesses greater bargaining power does not affect the basic functional form of the derived equation 
for empirical analysis 
In order to make our explanation easy to understand, we first analyze a situation in which 
greater bargaining power rests with the banks. Suppose a case where lenders’ monitoring activity 
does not contribute to firms’ profit. We assume that in this case firms can easily find banks eager to 
lend. In the case of such borrowing, the interest rate is determined by the following zero-profit 
condition of the bank.   37
Li exp(mi + ui)f (ui)dui
−∞
r*i −mi




− (Li + A)exp(r m) = 0
                  ( A 1 3 )  
where ri denotes the interest rate for this loan. Firm i’s reservation profit is determined by 
Ri = Li {exp(mi + ui)− exp(r i*)}f (ui)dui
r*i −mi
+∞
∫                         ( A 1 4 )  
From the above two equations we can rewrite firm i’s reservation profit as 
Ri = Li exp(mi + ui)f (ui)dui
−∞
+∞
∫ − (Li + A)exp(r m)                  ( A 1 5 )  
We assume that in the case of banks that can make a positive contribution ψ to their borrowers’ 
profit, greater bargaining power rests with the banks. Bank j can lend money to firm i at the interest 
rate that satisfies the following reservation-profit condition of the firm.   




i −mi −ψ j
+∞
∫
= Li exp(mi +ui)f(ui)dui
−∞
+∞
∫ − (Li + A)exp(rm)
                  ( A 1 6 )  
The loan interest rate is determined by the above equation.   
We next derive an equation for empirical analysis. In order to apply the implicit function 
theorem to equation (A16), we assume that ψj is not so large that there exists a positive value δ 
which satisfies the following inequality for any mi and ri
j.  
B = exp(mi + ui)f (ui)dui −
−∞
+∞
∫ exp(mi +ψ j + ui)f(ui)dui
r
j
i −mi −ψ j
+∞
∫ > δ       ( A 1 7 )  
We also introduce a new function, Ω( ), which is defined by 
) exp( ) ( ) ( ) exp(
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Ω( ) is a continuously differentiable function of the four variables. Under the assumption of   38
inequality (A17), Ω( ) is also a decreasing function of mi and takes a positive value for small enough 
values of mi and takes a negative value for large enough values of mi. Therefore we can apply the 
implicit function theorem to equation (A16) and express mi as a function of ψj, ri, Li. 
mi = m(ψ j,r i
j,Li)                                           ( A 1 8 )  
which satisfies 
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< 0                                ( A 2 1 )  
Using equation (A18) and function ψ( ) we can derive the following equation for the empirical 
analysis.  
mi +ψ j + ui = m(ψ(Γ j,nj),ri
j,Li)+ψ(Γj,nj )+ ui                ( A 2 2 )  
which can be rewritten as 
mi +ψ j + ui = g2(Γ j,nj,ri
j,Li)+ ui                            ( A 2 3 )  
g2( ) is an increasing function of Γj  and a decreasing function of Li, and ri
j. 
Finally, we study the case where firms enjoy the greater bargaining power and can borrow 
funds at the interest rate that satisfies the following zero-profit condition of the bank. 
Li exp(mi + ψ j + ui)f(ui)dui
−∞
r ji −mi −ψ j
∫ + Li exp(ri
j)f (ui)dui
r j
i −mi −ψ j
+∞
∫
− (Li + A + C(Γ j,nj))exp(rm) = 0
 (A23) 
Again we can apply the implicit function theorem to the above equation and derive   39
mi +ψ j + ui = h(ri
j,Li,C(Γj,nj ))+ ui 
which can be rewritten as 
mi +ψ j + ui = g3(Γj,nj,ri
j,Li) + ui 
g3( ) is an increasing function of Γj and a decreasing function of Li and ri
j.   40
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%Table I. Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables and Industry Distribution
1981-86 1987-91 1992-96
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Panel A: Main banks' characteristics
EOH ratio (%) 2.673 (1.822) 1.566 (1.048) 2.020 (1.517)
Firm's loan share in the bank's total loans (%) 0.089 (0.208) 0.050 (0.115) 0.046 (0.123)
Ratio of the number of projects to which the bank lends to the bank's total loans 0.038 (0.030) 0.019 (0.011) 0.035 (0.021)
Small and medium-sized firms' share in the number of projects to which the bank lends 0.974 (0.050) 0.976 (0.048) 0.989 (0.019)
Panel B: Non-main banks' average
EOH ratio (%) 3.105 (0.818) 1.894 (0.606) 2.338 (0.729)
Firm's loan share in the bank's total loans (%) 0.036 (0.069) 0.024 (0.047) 0.021 (0.047)
Ratio of the number of projects to which the bank lends to the bank's total loans 0.051 (0.018) 0.027 (0.011) 0.043 (0.014)
Small and medium-sized firms' share in the number of projects to which the bank lends 0.958 (0.035) 0.956 (0.038) 0.983 (0.013)
Panel C: The characteristics of the borrowing firms
Ratio of operating profits to total assets (%) 5.174 (4.284) 4.591 (3.673) 2.878 (3.521)
Average borrowing rate 0.136 (0.399) 0.081 (0.069) 0.072 (0.109)
Shareholding by top 10 shareholders (%) 48.276 (14.062) 48.927 (13.781) 48.905 (13.405)
Ratio of debt to total assets 0.743 (0.155) 0.690 (0.167) 0.646 (0.178)
Ratio of loan to debt 0.376 (0.184) 0.351 (0.201) 0.346 (0.210)
Ratio of loan from the main bank to total bank loans 0.267 (0.134) 0.284 (0.138) 0.287 (0.140)
Logarithm of total assets 10.414 (1.325) 10.716 (1.383) 10.960 (1.378)
Panel D: Share of each industry in the number of total samples
1981-86 1987-91 1992-96
Manufacturing 0.683 0.662 0.637
Wholesale and retail trade 0.112 0.127 0.142
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.004 0.004 0.004
Mining 0.009 0.007 0.007
Construction 0.097 0.085 0.080
Other finance  0.002 0.010 0.013
Real estate 0.015 0.017 0.018
Transport and communications 0.052 0.053 0.046
Service 0.027 0.034 0.053
Number of observations 6758 5535 6228
The table contains summary statistics of the major variables used in the regression analysis and the industry distribution of the sample firms.The sample consists of non-
financial firms that are listed on the first and second sections of the Japanese stock markets from 1980 to 1996. We exclude the electricity, gas and water supply industries
because these are heavily regulated industries. Each observation represents a firm/main bank pairs in any year from 1981 to 1996. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of
the main bank. Main bank is defined here as the largest lender in each year. This sample do not include those firms where two or more banks are the largest lender at the
same time. The EOH ratio is the period average of  the ratio of loan-project examining officers to total employees at headquarters of the bank. Panel B presents those of
other non-main banks' average.  Panel C contains data on the borrowing firms. Panel D shows the industry distirobution of the borrowing firms.Table II.  Estimation Results of the Bank Monitoring Activities on Borrower Firms' Profitability
1981-86 1987-91 1992-96
Variable Coef. Std. err. P>|z| Coef. Std. err. P>|z| Coef. Std. err. P>|z|
Main bank: EOH ratio -0.048 (0.031) 0.126 0.131 (0.045) 0.004 0.112 (0.028) 0
Main bank: Lending rate (approximated by average borrowing rate) -0.099 (0.112) 0.379 0.356 (0.677) 0.599 0.419 (0.318) 0.188
Main bank: Firm's loan share in the main bank's total loans -0.089 (0.279) 0.751 -0.223 (0.507) 0.66 -0.665 (0.328) 0.043
Main bank: Ratio of the number of the projects to which the bank lends to the bank's total loans -1.582 (3.251) 0.627 2.018 (6.544) 0.758 9.531 (2.621) 0
Main bank: Small and medium-sized firms' share in the number of projects to which the bank lends  3.627 (1.402) 0.01 2.683 (1.765) 0.129 0.381 (1.357) 0.779
Non-main banks: Average of EOH ratio 0.110 (0.061) 0.07 -0.102 (0.083) 0.216 0.013 (0.066) 0.841
Non-main banks: Average of the firm's loan share in the bank's total loans  0.367 (0.927) 0.692 -0.496 (1.382) 0.72 0.601 (1.249) 0.631
Non-main banks: Average of the number of projects to which the bank lends to the bank's total loans -5.994 (3.901) 0.124 29.161 (4.488) 0 11.079 (3.441) 0.001
2.687 (1.256) 0.032 4.988 (1.096) 0 2.043 (2.643) 0.44
Shareholding by top 10 shareholders 0.013 (0.003) 0 0.011 (0.003) 0.001 0.014 (0.003) 0
Ratio of debt to total assets -10.564 (0.363) 0 -5.698 (0.304) 0 -2.734 (0.267) 0
Ratio of loan to debt -0.565 (0.305) 0.064 -2.243 (0.288) 0 -3.683 (0.242) 0
Ratio of loan from the main bank to all bank loans -0.509 (0.377) 0.177 -1.199 (0.339) 0 -0.629 (0.311) 0.043
Logarithm of total assets 0.256 (0.049) 0 -0.113 (0.049) 0.021 0.078 (0.042) 0.068
Constant 4.914 (1.944) 0.011 1.339 (2.194) 0.542 0.797 (3.002) 0.791
Number of observations 6758 5535 6228
Number of banks 71 70 75
Log likelihood -18338.4 -14313.7 -15985.1
Wald chi2 1865.53 1241.78 1181.56
Prob>chi2 000
Non-main banks: Average of small and medium-sized firms' share in the number of projects to which
the bank lends
The dependent variable is the firm's operating profits to total assets. We estimate the same regression model for the three periods of 1981-86, 1987-91, and 1992-96. All independent variables exept EOH
ratio are the vaules at t-1. The EOH ratio is the period average of the ratio of loan-project examining officers to the total employees at headquarters. Estimated coefficients are obtained by FGLS where we
assume the error term is composed of the random effect associated with the bank and the idiosyncratic error. All regressions include industry dummies, bank type dummies, and time dummies, which are
not reported here to save space. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.Table III. Estimated Bank Premium (Results of the First-Stage Regression)
1987-91 1992-96
Bank dummy variable Coef. Std. err. P>|t| Coef. Std. err. P>|t|
INDUSTRIAL BANK OF JAPAN ... ...
LONG-TERM CREDIT BANK OF JAPAN 0.291 (0.432) 0.501 1.232 (0.667) 0.065
NIPPON CREDIT BANK 1.125 (0.750) 0.133 1.857 (0.788) 0.018
DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK -1.334 (0.543) 0.014 1.354 (0.574) 0.018
SAKURA BANK -0.771 (0.693) 0.266 0.248 (0.538) 0.645
FUJI BANK 0.817 (0.671) 0.223 -0.394 (0.663) 0.552
MITSUBISHI BANK -0.367 (0.577) 0.525 0.731 (0.766) 0.34
ASAHI BANK . . . 0.711 (0.702) 0.311
SANWA BANK -0.703 (0.568) 0.216 1.281 (0.540) 0.018
SUMITOMO BANK 0.275 (0.579) 0.634 0.550 (0.593) 0.353
DAIWA BANK 1.370 (0.908) 0.131 0.680 (0.810) 0.401
TOKAI BANK 0.343 (0.677) 0.613 0.434 (0.590) 0.462
HOKKAIDO TAKUSHOKU BANK 0.127 (0.535) 0.813 1.745 (1.137) 0.125
TAIYO KOBE BANK -0.231 (0.504) 0.647 . . .
BANK OF TOKYO 0.018 (0.951) 0.985 2.554 (0.786) 0.001
SAITAMA BANK -0.859 (1.997) 0.667 . . .
AKITA BANK -10.254 (4.342) 0.018 6.271 (1.328) 0
BANK OF IWATE -4.210 (1.288) 0.001 . . .
77 BANK -7.265 (0.989) 0 . . .
GUNMA BANK 1.772 (2.377) 0.456 -2.481 (0.545) 0
ASHIKAGA BANK 1.540 (2.276) 0.499 2.148 (0.851) 0.012
JOYO BANK . . . 1.173 (0.808) 0.147
CHIBA BANK -0.660 (0.793) 0.406 -0.742 (1.591) 0.641
CHIBA KOGYO BANK 2.978 (1.357) 0.028 -2.998 (1.665) 0.072
TOKYO TOMIN BANK -1.211 (3.851) 0.753 0.656 (1.138) 0.565
BANK OF YOKOHAMA 2.552 (0.891) 0.004 0.705 (0.661) 0.286
DAISHI BANK -0.556 (0.852) 0.514 -2.843 (1.081) 0.009
HOKUETSU BANK . . . 0.772 (1.191) 0.517
HACHIJUNI BANK . . . -0.213 (1.204) 0.859
HOKURIKU BANK 0.213 (0.766) 0.781 0.738 (0.993) 0.458
HOKKOKU BANK -1.284 (1.227) 0.295 0.312 (0.851) 0.714
FUKUI BANK 2.055 (1.788) 0.251 . . .
SHIZUOKA BANK -0.725 (1.254) 0.563 1.681 (0.675) 0.013
SURUGA BANK -0.985 (1.855) 0.596 -2.369 (1.337) 0.077
JUROKU BANK -0.196 (1.242) 0.875 . . .
HYAKUGO BANK 0.359 (0.959) 0.708 -1.655 (0.982) 0.092
SHIGA BANK 0.270 (1.289) 0.834 . . .
BANK OF KYOTO -5.190 (1.102) 0 -4.377 (1.663) 0.009
BANK OF IKEDA . . . -0.107 (0.535) 0.842
KIYO BANK . . . 0.588 (1.156) 0.611
SAN-IN GODO BANK . . . 2.490 (1.514) 0.1
CHUGOKU BANK -0.765 (1.347) 0.57 . . .
HIROSHIMA BANK -0.155 (1.202) 0.897 0.002 (1.133) 0.999
YAMAGUCHI BANK 1.443 (1.696) 0.395 -0.983 (1.063) 0.355
HYAKUJUSHI BANK . . . 0.397 (0.701) 0.572
IYO BANK . . . -1.090 (0.812) 0.179
BANK OF FUKUOKA 1.708 (2.190) 0.435 -0.413 (0.573) 0.471
BANK OF SAGA 8.654 (1.761) 0 . . .
EIGHTEENTH BANK -2.226 (6.732) 0.741 -1.807 (1.806) 0.317
MIYAZAKI BANK . . . -0.067 (0.926) 0.942
KAGOSHIMA BANK -1.483 (1.399) 0.289 . . .
MITSUI TRUST AND BANKING -0.934 (0.890) 0.294 0.424 (0.886) 0.632
MITSUBISHI TRUST AND BANKING 0.429 (0.847) 0.613 0.684 (0.765) 0.371
YASUDA TRUST AND BANKING 0.163 (0.773) 0.833 0.907 (0.852) 0.287
TOYO TRUST AND BANKING 0.054 (0.886) 0.952 4.156 (1.558) 0.008
CHUO TRUST & BANKING 0.378 (1.413) 0.789 -5.290 (0.617) 0
NIPPON TRUST BANK . . . 0.001 (1.384) 1
SUMITOMO TRUST AND BANKING 0.413 (0.683) 0.546 -0.130 (0.872) 0.882
NORTH PACIFIC BANK . . . -0.088 (1.529) 0.954
KEIYO BANK . . . -6.789 (1.771) 0
TOKYO SOWA BANK 0.844 (1.405) 0.548 -0.061 (0.932) 0.947
TAIKO BANK 1.633 (2.816) 0.562 . . .
AICHI BANK . . . -1.153 (1.033) 0.265
BANK OF NAGOYA . . . -4.481 (4.532) 0.323
DAISAN BANK . . . -2.200 (0.970) 0.023
BIWAKO BANK -1.514 (1.068) 0.156 7.684 (2.583) 0.003
BANK OF KINKI 4.233 (1.628) 0.009 . . .
BANK OF NANIWA . . . 7.371 (1.715) 0
FUKUTOKU BANK . . . -0.340 (1.221) 0.781
BANK OF KANSAI -3.481 (1.503) 0.021 9.266 (1.663) 0
HANWA BANK . . . -0.567 (1.579) 0.719
MIDORI BANK 2.763 (1.477) 0.061 . . .
NISHI-NIPPON BANK 2.900 (1.820) 0.111 -0.860 (1.019) 0.399
FUKUOKA CITY BANK . . . -1.066 (1.258) 0.397
Number of observations 5535 6228
Adjusted R-squared 0.7497 0.7584
This table shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors of the bank dummy variables obtained from the first-stage
regression for the periods of 1987-91 and 1992-96. The dependent variable is the firm's operating profits to total assets.  All
regressions include the same explanatory variables as in Table 3, except that EOH ratio is excluded while bank dummies
(reported here) and firm specific effects (not reported here) are included. Estimated coefficients are obtained by a firm fixed-
effects procedure. The Industrial Bank of Japan is excluded. We use the bank name in March, 1995. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.Table IV.  Main Bank Monitoring Activities and Firm Premium (Results of the Second-Stage Regression) 
1987-91 1992-96
Variable Coef. Std. err. P>|t| Coef. Std. err. P>|t|
EOH ratio (main bank) 0.246 (0.094) 0.009 0.229 (0.078) 0.003
Logarithm of total assets 2.510 (0.067) 0 0.880 (0.085) 0
Constant -26.928 (0.754) 0 -9.936 (0.972) 0
Number of observations 1377 1512
R-squared 0.5099 0.0973
The dependent variable is the estiamted firm specific effects obtained from the regression analysis in Table 4 (not
reported). The EOH ratio is weighted mean of the ratio of loan-application examining officers to total employees at
headquarters of the main bank. Logarithm of total assets are the period average. All second-stage regressions include
industry dummy variables. Estimated coefficients are obtained by WLS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.Table V.  Main Bank Monitoring Activites and Bank Premium (Results of the Second-Stage Regression) 
1987-91 1992-96
Variable Coef. Std. err. P>|t| Coef. Std. err. P>|t|
EOH ratio (main bank) -0.051 (0.219) 0.816 -0.214 (0.146) 0.15
Constant 0.842 (0.637) 0.192 2.045 (0.408) 0
Number of observations 53 60
R-squared 0.0056 0.0468
The dependent variable is the estiamted coefficient of bank dummy reported in Table 4. The EOH ratio is the ratio of loan-
application examining officers to total employees at headquarters of the main bank. All second-stage regressions include
bank type dummy variables. Estimated coefficients are obtained by WLS.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.